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STATEMENT OF THE c,.;sE 
Nature of the Case 
in these consolidated appeals, Justin Ryan Moss appea,s from the district 
court's orde;-s revoking his probation in Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600 and from 
the district court's order revoking his probation and ordering his sentence 
executed without reduction in Docket No. 38541. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Moss opened a U.S. Bank checking account in March 2005. (PSI, 
1 
pp.456-57.") After Moss failed to deposit any money into the account and 
incurred negative balances, the bank "forcibly closed" the account in February 
2006. (PSI, p.457.) A little more than two months later, on April 22, 2006, Moss 
wrote a check on the closed account, payable to Idaho River Sports, in the 
amount $5,330.31. (PSI, pp.456-57, 488.) 
The state charged Moss in Docket No. 38600 with issuing a check without 
funds. (#38600 R., pp.26-27.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Moss pied guilty 
and the state agreed to recommend probation. (#38600 R., p.43.) The district 
court accepted Moss' plea, entered an order withholding judgment, and placed 
Moss on probation for three years. (#38600 R., pp.44-53.) 
While still on probation in Docket No. 38600, Moss fraudulently obtained 
Cheryl Unruh's financial transaction card number and used it to make payments 
toward the rental of a desktop computer and plasma television from Central 
1 Citations to page numbers of the PSI correspond to the page numbers of the 
electronic fiie "MossPS!.pdf." 
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Rent-to-Own. (PSI, pp.383-84, 396-403.) In total, "six payments totaling 
$450.72 were charged to Ms. Unruh's card." (PSI, p.383.) 
The state charged Moss in Docket No. 38590 with grand theft. (#38590 
R., pp.30-31.) The state also filed a motion for probation violation in Docket No. 
38600. (#38600 R., pp.76-77.) Pursuant to the state's motion, the cases were 
consolidated for purposes of plea and sentencing. (#38600 R., pp.84-86.) Moss 
thereafter pied guilty to grand theft in Docket No. 38590 and admitted to having 
violated his probation in Docket No. 38600. (#38590 R., pp.34-35; #38600 R., 
pp.87-88.) In Docket No. 38600, the district court revoked Moss' withheld 
judgment and probation, imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one 
and one-half year fixed, but suspended the sentence and reinstated Moss on 
probation for three years. (#38600 R., pp.89-94; #38590 R., pp.36-37.) In 
Docket No. 38590, the court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with five 
years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Moss on probation for 10 
years with the condition that he serve 120 days in jail. (#38590 R., pp.36-37, 49-
56; #38600 R., pp.89-90.) The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. 
(#38590 R., p.50.) 
Moss was released from jail on December 22, 2008. (#38600 R., p.101; 
#38590 R., p.61.) In January 2009, Moss' grandmother reported to police that 
Moss had forged her signature on several student loan applications. (PSI, pp.2, 
26-34, 276-81.) Moss had asked his grandmother to co-sign on two student 
loans in 2007. (PSI, pp.2, 26, 276.) Moss' grandmother considered doing so 
but, after reviewing the repayment schedule and consulting with Moss' father, 
2 
she told Moss she would r.ot co-si:;;-i on the :oa:1s (PSI, pp.2, 26, 276.) '.n 
January 2009, despite having never persona'.iy co-signed on any student loan 
application, Moss' grandmother received a collection notice from American 
Education Services (AES) attempting to collect past due payments for two 
student loans in rv1oss' name. (PSI, pp.2, 26, 276.) Moss' grandmother 
requested and received copies of the student loan applications from AES and 
discovered that Moss had forged her signature as a co-signer on the 
applications. (PS!, pp.2, 26, 276.) The loans were for $10,000 and $14,000, 
respectively. (PSI, pp.26-27, 276-77.) Upon receiving the student loan checks 
made payable to Moss and his grandmother, Moss forged his grandmother's 
endorsement on the back of the checks so that he could cash them. (PSI, pp.2, 
26-27, 276-77; 6/30/09 Tr., p.12, L.15 - p.13, L.12.) Moss also forged his 
grandmother's name on a third student loan application, for $18,000, but the 
money was never disbursed. (PSI, p.281.) 
The state charged Moss in Docket No. 38541 with five counts of forgery. 
(#38541 R., pp.33-35.) The state also filed motions for probation violation in 
Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600. (#38600 R., pp.102-04; #38590 R., pp.62-64.) 
In Docket No. 38541, Moss pied guilty to two counts of forgery, and the state 
dismissed the remaining counts and also dismissed a separate case in which 
Moss was charged with four counts of issuing insufficient funds checks between 
January and Ma,ch 2009. (#38541 R., pp.57-58; 6/30/09 Tr., p.1, L.15 - p.2, 
L.11.) Moss also admitted to having violated his probation in Docket Nos. 38590 
and 38600. (#38600 R., pp.124-25; #38590 R., pp.86-87.) !n Docket No. 38541, 
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the district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 10 years, with five 
years fixed, and retalned j 1 R, pp.59-60, 65-69.) In Docket 
Nos. 38590 and 38600, 
and 
R., pp.86-90.) At the end of 
court revoked Moss' probation, ordered 
jurisdiction. (#38600 R, pp.124-28; #38590 
retained jurisdiction period, the district courts 
suspended Moss' sentences in all three cases and placed him on probation - for 
1 0 years in Docket No. 38541, for nine years in Docket No. 38590, and for one 
year in Docket No. 38600. 1 R., pp.73-74, 77-84; #38600 R., pp.131-40; 
#38590 , pp.91 100.) 
Approximately four months later, in June 2010, the state filed motions for 
probation violation in all three cases, alleging, inter alia, that Moss changed 
residences without permission, left his assigned district without permission, failed 
to report to his probation officer as instructed, and absconded supervision. 
(#38600 R, pp.141-43; #38590 , pp.101-03; #38541 R., pp.90-94.) After an 
evidentiary hearing in Docket No. 38541, the district court found that Moss had 
violated his probation by changing residences without permission, leaving his 
assigned district without permission, failing to report to his probation officer, and 
absconding supervision. (#38541 R., pp.111-14, 118-19; 2/1/11 Tr., p.62, L.2 
p.64, L.8.) The district court revoked Moss' probation and ordered his sentences 
executed without reduction. (#38541 R., pp.115-16, 120-23.) Thereafter, in 
Docket Nos. 38600 and 38590, the district court also found Moss in violation of 
his probation and, consistent with Moss' request that it do so, it revoked Moss' 
probation and ordered his underlying sentences executed. (#38600 R., pp.180-
4 
34; #38590 R., pp.140-44; §e~ 3/2/i 1 Tr., p.57. L.13 - p.59, L.2, p.60, l.25 -
p.61, L.9 (Moss stipulating to the "im;:)Ositon of his underlying sentence").) 
Moss filed notices of appeal, timely from the district courts' orders 
revoking his probation in all three cases. (#38600 R., pp.185-88; #38590 R., 
pp.147-50; #38541 R., pp.125--28.) By order of the Idaho Supreme Court, the 
cases have been consolidated for appeal. (See #38590 R., pp.2-3.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Moss due process 
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment 
with requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Moss' probation? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to 
reduce Mr. Moss' unified sentence of ten years, with five 
years fixed, in docket number 38541, upon revoking his 
probation? 
(Appellant's brief, 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Moss failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record with irrelevant transcripts? 
2. Is Moss precluded by the doctrine of invited error from challenging the 
district court's decision to revoke his probation in Docket Nos. 38590 and 
38600? 
3. Has Moss failed to establish that the district court abused its dlscretion, 
either by revoking his probation, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for 




Moss Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Su rer:1e Cou1i Violated His 
Den in His Motion To Au ment The A ellate Record 
VVith lrrelevant Transcripts 
A Introduction 
After the appellate record was settled, Moss fiied a motion to augment 
with as-yet unprepared transcripts of various district court hearings heid between 
one and two years before the district court revoked Moss' probation and ordered 
his sentences executed in February 2011 (Docket No. 38541) and March 2011 
(Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600), respectively. 2 (Motion To Augment And To 
Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof, filed July 15, 
2011 (hereinafter "Motion To Augment").) The Idaho Supreme Court denied the 
motion, stating as its reason therefor that "there is no showing that the 
[requested transcripts] contain material relevant to any issue in the above 
entitled appeal." (Order Denying Motion To Augment And To Suspend The 
Briefing Schedule, filed August 15, 2011.) 
Moss now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record with the requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has violated his 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has effectively 
denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-
2 Moss filed a timely objection to the record in the district court (see Objection To 
The Record, filed June 22, 2011 ), but he withdrew that objection to pursue a 
determination by the Idaho Supreme Court whether the requested transcripts 
were necessary to provide an adequate record on appeal (see Order Granting 
Motion To Withdraw Objection To The Record And Vacate Hearing, filed July 7, 
2011; Motion To Augment, p.2). 
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15.) Moss has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights, however, 
because he has failed to show that the requested transcripts are even relevant 
to, much less necessary for resolution of, the only issues over which this Court 
has jurisdiction on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
C. Moss Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The 
Requested Augmentations 
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is 
sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the 
proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 
(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and 
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, 
however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide 
transcripts or other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 
n.5 (1996) ("an indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial 
record that are germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations 
8 
;:;mitted)); Lane, 372 U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the 
record is :iot sufficient, the defendant must show that any omissions from ihe 
record prejudiced h:s ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 !daho 615, 
620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 
148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 
(1st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice Moss "must present something more than 
gross speculation that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. 
Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002). Moss has failed to carry this burden. 
Moss' appeal is timely only from the district court's February 10, 2011 
Order Revoking Probation, Imposing Sentence and Commitment in Docket No. 
38541, and from the district court's March 3, 2011 Order[sJ of Revocation of 
Probation, imposition of Sentence and Commitment in Docket Nos. 28590 and 
38600. (See #38541 R., p.120 (order revoking probation, filed February 10, 
2011), p.125 (notice of appeal, filed February 16, 2011); #38590 R., p.142 (order 
revoking probation, filed March 3, 2011), p.147 (notice of appeal, filed March 7, 
2011 ); #38600 R., p.182 (order revoking probation, filed March 3, 2011 ), p.185 
(notice of appeal, filed March 7, 2011 ).) He argues that the Idaho Supreme 
Court denied him due process and equal protection by denying his motion to 
augment the appellate record with the as-yet unprepared transcripts of the 
following proceedings: (1) an unidentified "hearing" held on February 9, 2010, in 
Docket No. 38541; (2) a probation violation hearing held on September 3, 2009, 
in Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600; (3) a disposition hearing heid on September 
17, 2009, in Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600; and (4) a jurisdictional review 
hearing held on February 11, 2010, in al! three cases. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
Moss has failed to explain, much less demonstrate, however, how transcripts of 
hearings held between one and two years before the decisions at issue in this 
case are necessary to decide the only issues over which this Court has 
jurisdiction on this appeal. There is no evidence that the district court judges had 
the requested transcripts when they revoked Moss' probation in February and 
March 2011, or that they relied upon anything said at the previous hearings as a 
basis for their decisions to revoke Moss' probation and order execution of his 
sentences. Because the as-yet unprepared transcripts were never presented to 
the lower courts in relation to the probation revocation proceedings, they were 
never part of the records before the district courts in considering whether to 
revoke Moss' probation and are not properly considered for the first time on 
appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 
(Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a decision on the issues raised on appeal, the 
appellate court is "limited to review of the record made below" and 'will not 
consider new evidence that was never before the trial court"); see also Huerta v. 
Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of 
this Court to entertain new allegations of fact and consider new evidence."). In 
short, Moss has failed to show how the requested transcripts are relevant to any 
issue arising from the revocation of probation and the execution of his 
sentences, the only issues over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. 
The state recognizes the Court of Appeals' statement in State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct App. 2009), relied on by Moss 
10 
(Appe!;ant's brief, ~1.12), ihat a;'.}pe!late "review [of] a sentence that is ordered into 
execution following a period of probation" is based ·'upon the facts existing when 
the sentence was imposed as \Net! as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation." Contrary to Moss' apparer,t claim 
on appeal, however, Hanington does not stand for the proposition that a merits-
based review of a decision to revoke probation and order a sentence executed 
requires preparation and inclusion in the appellate record of transcripts of every 
hearing over which the trial court presided. To the contrary, the law is well 
established that, absent a showing that evidence was presented at prior 
hearings, and/or that the district court relied on such evidence in reaching its 
decision to revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to transcription at public 
expense of every hearing conducted before the date probation was finally 
revoked. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971) (state is not 
"required to expend its funds unnecessarily" where "part or al! of the 
stenographic transcript . . . will not be germane to consideration of the appeal" 
(citation and internal quotations omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496 (''(T]he fact 
that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by unnecessarily 
including in the record all of the transcripts does not mean that the State must 
waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate appellate 
review."); see also Strand, 137 Idaho at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78 (indigent 
appellant challenging denial of Rule 35 motion not entitled to transcription at 
public expense of Rule 35 hearing at which no evidence was presented). 
11 
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the 
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review the revocation of 
probation, Moss has failed to show that any such circumstances apply here. 
Moss has failed to point to anything in the record that would indicate that what 
happened at the 2009 and 2010 hearings was considered or played any role in 
the courts' decisions in February and March 2011 to revoke Moss' probation and 
order his sentences executed. As such, Moss has failed to show that such 
transcripts are necessary to complete an adequate record on this appeal. 
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), Moss claims that he 
Is only required to make a "colorable argument" that he needs an "item" or 
"items" to complete a record before the burden transfers to the state "to prove 
that the requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's brief, 
p.11.) He also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the 
constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must 
provide him (and all indigent defendants) with whatever appellate record he 
desires unless the state proves that "some or all of the requested materials are 
unnecessary or frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p.8; see also p.6 ("The only way a 
court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested 
transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.").) 
No reading of Mayer supports these legal arguments. 
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and 
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct. kl at 190. The appellate court denied his request for 
12 
a trial transcript at gove,:1,:1ent expense en the !::asis of a 1cical ruie providing that 
verbatim transcripts of triai proceedi:igs \Nou!d be ;Yovided at government 
expense only for felonies. lct.: at 191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was 
entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitied to a verbatim 
transcript of his trial. lg_,_ at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar 
issue ~n Draper v. Vvashington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that 
the government need not provide transcripts that were not '"germane to 
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds 
unnecessarily in such circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 
372 U.S. at 495-96). However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record 
where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would 
be available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way." .lst_ at 195. 
"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable 
need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a 
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on 
those grounds." kl 
Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must 
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal. lg_,_ at 
194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is 
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant 
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some 
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate. _!_c;L at 194-95. See also 
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether 
13 
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to 
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a 
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may 
take notice of the importance of a transcript). 
Here the proceedings challenged on appeal are the revocation of Moss' 
probation and the execution of his sentences, without reduction, in February and 
March 2011. The record related to the district courts' decisions to revoke Moss' 
probation and order his sentences executed without reduction is already 
complete because all of the evidence considered by the district courts is before 
the appellate court. (Se~ generally, PSI; #38541 2/1/11 Tr. (evidentiary hearing); 
#38541 2/2/8/11 Tr. (disposition hearing); #38590 and #38600 3/2/11 Tr. 
(disposition hearing).) It is Moss' appellate burden to establish that the 
requested transcripts are necessary to create an adequate appellate record to 
review the orders revoking his probation. The augmentations he sought, 
however, were of never before prepared transcripts of hearings held between 
one and two years before the district courts rendered the decisions that are at 
issue in this case. Nothing in the record even suggests that the requested 
transcripts or anything contained therein were before the district courts in relation 
to the probation revocation proceedings. Because Moss failed to make a 
showing of germaneness and colorable need for the requested transcripts, there 
is no burden on the state. Because all of the evidence before the district courts 
is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate review, and Moss 
14 
has failed to establish a vioiatic:·1 of his due process rights.3 Strand, 137 Idaho at 
463, 50 P.3d at 478. 
Moss has also failed to establ:sh that denial of his reqL!est to augment the 
record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied him equal protection. Moss 
cites to several cases where crlminal defendants were denied appellate records 
because of their indigence. (See Appellant's brief, pp.7-12 (citing,~. Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. VVashinqton, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. 
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the record that in 
any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Moss' request for 
transcripts solely because he is indigent. In fact, Moss' motion would have 
properly been denied even if he had the funds to pay for the transcripts. The 
Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation to set forth a 
ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested. I.AR. 30. Moss' motion 
to augment failed because he failed to meet this minimal burden, imposed upon 
all parties, of showing that the transcripts were necessary or even helpful in 
addressing appellate issues. The Idaho Supreme Court's order properly denied 
the motion to augment because Moss failed to make a showing that any 
appellant - indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to augment the record as 
3 As a component of his due process claim, Moss argues that the denial of his 
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-15.) 
Because, for the reasons already explained, Moss has failed to show that the 
requested transcripts are necessary, or even relevant, for appellate review of the 
district court's order revoking his probation, there is no possibility that the denial 
of the motion to augment has deprived Moss of effective assistance of counsel 
on this appeal. 
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requested. There is no reason to believe that the motion to augment would 
have been granted had Moss been paying for the requested transcripts; the rule 
applies to all parties, not just the indigent. 
Moss has failed to show that the denial of his motion to augment was 
any way influenced or decided by his indigence, nor has he demonstrated that 
the requested transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate to review 
any issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. To the contrary, the 
record amply demonstrates that Moss' motion to augment was properly denied 
because he failed to show that the transcripts he requested were necessary for 
adequate review of the district courts' decisions to revoke Moss' probation and 
order execution of his sentences. Because Moss has failed to show his due 
process and equal protection rights were implicated, much less violated, by the 
denial of his motion to augment, he has failed to show any basis for relief. 
11. 
Moss Is Precluded By The Doctrine Of Invited Error From Challenging The 
Revocation Of Probation In Docket Nos. 38590 And 38600 
"The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an 
error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error." State v. 
Norton, 151 Idaho 176,187,254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. 
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)). The purpose 
of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who "caused or played an 
important role in prompting a trial court" to take a particular action from "later 
challenging that decision on appeal." State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 
P .2d 117, 120 (1999). "One may not complain of errors one has consented to or 
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109 ,daho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. L~e, i31 idahc 600, 
605, 961 P.2d 'i 203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1998)). The invited en-or doctrine applies to 
sentencing decisions, as well as to rulings made durin;i trial. State v. Leyva, 117 
idaho 462, 465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Moss argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his 
probation and ordering his sentences executed in Docket Nos. 38590 and 
38600. (Appellant's brief, pp.3, 15-20.) As acknowledged by Moss on appeal, 
however (see Appellant's brief, p.3 n.2), Moss stipulated at the disposition 
hearing to the revocation of his probation and the "imposition of his underlying 
sentence[s]" in Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600 and, in fact, specifically asked the 
district court to order his underlying sentences executed (#38600 3/2/11 Tr., 
p.57, L.13 - p.59, L.2, p.60, L.25 - p.61, L.9). Because Moss specifically asked 
the court to revoke his probation and order his underlying sentences executed, 
Moss is precluded by the invited error doctrine from complaining on appeal that 
the district court abused its discretion by doing so. 
111. 
Moss Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion In Docket No. 38541 
A Introduction 
After Moss pied guilty to two counts of forgery in Docket No. 38541, the 
district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 10 years, with five years 
fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (#38541 R., pp.59-60, 65-69.) Following the 
period of retained ]urisdiction, the district court placed Moss on probation 
17 
(#38541 R., pp.73-74, 77-84), which Moss violated almost immediately by 
absconding supervision (#38541 R., pp.90-94, 111-14, 118-19). Concluding that 
Moss was "not a candidate for probation" and that the sentences originally 
imposed were necessary to protect society and to deter Moss and impress upon 
him the seriousness of his criminal conduct (2/8/11 Tr., p.48, L.6 - p.49, L.6), the 
district court revoked Moss' probation and ordered his underlying sentences 
executed without reduction (#38541 R., pp.115-16, 120-23; 2/8/11 Tr., p.49, 
Ls.4-10). 
On appeal, Moss argues that the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking his probation because the probation violations that were aileged and 
which he was found to have committed did not involve the commission of any 
new crimes and because, he contends, "there are mitigating factors present" that 
militate against the revocation of probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-20.) He 
also contends that the court abused its discretion by declining to reduce his 
underlying sentences, citing the same "mitigating factors" he claims militated 
against the revocation of his probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.20-22.) None of 
Moss' arguments establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
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!\foss Has Failed To Establish ThEJ The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Revoking His Probation And Orderinq H~s Sentence 
Executed Vvithout Reduction 
A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on 
appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. State v. Lafferty, 
i25 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994). An abuse of 
discretion cannot be found if the district court's decision was consistent with 
applicable legal standards, and was reached by an exercise of reason. lfL 
'The purpose of probation is rehabilitation." State v. VVilson, '127 Idaho 
506, 510, 903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). "In deciding whether revocation of 
probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether 
the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued 
probation is consistent with protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 
525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001). Any cause satisfactory to the court, 
which indicates that probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify 
revocation. Wilson, 127 Idaho at 510, 903 P.2d at 99. Contrary to Moss' 
assertions on appeal, a review of the record supports the district court's 
determination that Moss' probation was no longer achieving the goal of 
rehabilitation nor consistent with the protection of society under the facts of this 
case. 
Moss has repeatedly demonstrated himself incapable of or unwilling to 
comply with the law and the terms of probation. While on probation for issuing a 
check without funds in Docket No. 38600, r.foss stoie someone else's credit card 
number and used it to make payments on 'r-No luxury items - a computer and a 
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flat screen plasma television. (PSI, pp.383-84, 396-403.) Despite having 
committed this new crime, Moss was continued on probation in Docket No. 
38600 and was also placed on probation after pleading to grand theft in Docket 
No. 38590. (#38600 R., pp.89-94; #38590 R., pp.49-56.) As a condition of his 
probation in Docket No. 38590, Moss was required to serve 120 days in jail, 
during which time he was to participate in and complete substance abuse 
treatment and behavioral change programming (#38590 R., p.51.) Moss 
completed the required programming and was released from jail in December 
2008. (#38590 R., pp.57-61.) One month later, law enforcement learned that 
Moss had forged his grandmother's signature on three student loan applications 
and two student loan checks, resulting in the payment to Moss of over $25,000 in 
fraudulently obtained student loan funds. (PSI, pp.2, 26-34, 276-81.) While 
investigating the forgeries, law enforcement discovered that Moss had also 
written numerous insufficfent funds checks between January and March 2009. 
(PSI, pp.151-62.) 
After Moss pied guilty to two counts of forgery in Docket No. 38541 and 
admitted to having violated his probation in Docket Nos. 38600 and 38590, the 
district courts retained jurisdiction in all three cases. (#38541 R., pp.65-69; 
#38600 R., pp.124-28; #38590 R., pp.86-90.) Following the period of retained 
jurisdiction, Moss was given yet another opportunity to prove himself amenable 
to community supervision. (#38541 R., pp.77-84; #38600 R., pp.131-40; #38590 
R., pp.91-100.) On February 18, 2010, six days after the district court entered its 
order placing Moss on probation in Docket No. 38541, Moss attended a 
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L.6.) V/ithin days of the orientat!on, Moss moved to California, without 
contacting his probation officer and without otherwise seeking perm;ssion to do 
so. (PSi, pp.6O3-O4; 2/1/11 Tr., p.16, L.5 - p.25, L.19.) Moss' probation officer 
attempted numerous times to contact Moss but was unsuccessful. (PS!, p.6O4; 
2/1/11 Tr., p.16, L.5- p.17, L.14.) When he finally did talk to Moss on April 15, 
2010, he ordered Moss to return to Idaho and to report personally to the 
Department of Probation and Parole on April 26, 2010. (PSI, p.6O5; 2/1/11 Tr., 
p.25, L.25 - p.26, L 13.) Moss failed to do so and did not return to Idaho until he 
was arrested on a bench warrant in November 2010. (2/1 /11 Tr., p.26, Ls.12-23, 
p.27, Ls.1-7, p.38, L.13 - p.39, L.3.) 
In deciding to revoke Moss' probation, the district court specifically 
considered the nature of Moss' probation violations and whether continuing Moss 
on probation was consistent either with Moss' rehabilitation or the protection of 
society. (2/8/11 Tr., p.48, L.6 - p.49, L.1O.) Noting that it had taken a chance on 
Moss originally (presumably in light of Moss' prior criminal record and his history 
of violating probation), the district court concluded that, assuming Moss was ever 
a candidate for probation, that was no longer the case. (2/8/11 Tr., p.48, Ls.6-
19.) The court was understandably troubled by the fact that, almost immediate!y 
after being placed on probation following the period of retained jurisdiction. Moss 
moved to California without permission and willfully failed to make himself 
available for SU;Jervision. (2/8/11 Tr., p.48, Ls.10-16.) The court also fo~nd 
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incredible Moss' claims that he had verbal permission from some unnamed 
probation official to move to California (2/1/11 Tr., p.62, L.12 - p.64, L.2), and it 
characterized Moss as "but loosely acquainted with the truth" (2/8/11 Tr., p.48, 
Ls. 15-16). Given Moss' history of theft-related offenses, his demonstrated 
inability or unwillingness to comply with the terms of every probation he has been 
granted and, more specifically, his demonstrated inability to comply with the 
conditions of his probation in the instant case that required him to avail himself of 
supervision, the district court acted well within its discretion in concluding that 
probation was neither achieving the goal of rehabilitation nor consistent with the 
protection of society. 
On appeal, Moss concedes that he violated the terms of his probation. 
(Appellant's brief, p.16.) He argues, however, that the district court abused its 
discretion by revoking his probation because his probation violations did not 
involve the commission of any new crimes. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.) Moss' 
argument fails to show an abuse of discretion for at least two reasons. First, it 
ignores the fact that Moss has been afforded numerous opportunities for 
probation in numerous cases and, on each occasion, Moss has proven himself 
unabte to comply with the conditions of probation, whether it be refraining from 
committing new crimes or, as in this case, availing himself of supervision. 
Second, although the state did not allege any new crimes as the basis for its 
motion to revoke Moss' probation, this does not ipso facto mean, as Moss 
contends, that "Moss' probation was not threatening society." (Appellant's brief, 
p.17.) Moss has a history of writing bad checks and stealing from others for his 
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own financial gain. By ab;;ccnding sc.1pervlslor1, Moss deprived the probation 
department and the cou:i of the abi!ity to rnonitor his activities to ensure that he 
did not revert to his manipulative and deceitful behavior. 
Moss also contends that there are other mitigating factors that militated 
against the revocation of his probation. Specifically, his cites his mental health 
issues, family support, education and employment, and "troubled childhood" as 
reasons that the district court shou,d have continued him on probation. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.17-20.) information with respect to ail of these facts was 
before the court, both at the time it imposed sentence and when it revoked Moss' 
probation. That the district court did not place greater mitigating weight on these 
factors, or elevate them above the need to protect society from Moss' unyielding 
propensity to take advantage of and manipulate others and the system, does not 
establish an abuse of discretion. The district court specifically considered the 
fact that Moss had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and his claims that he 
was not on his medication when he committed the underlying crimes (2/8/11 Tr., 
o.42, L.19 - p.43, L.5), but it rejected this as a basis to continue Moss on 
probation, concluding that, "medicine or not," Moss had demonstrated himself to 
be "not suitable for probation" (2/8/11 Tr., p.48, Ls.10-19). Even assuming the 
truth of Moss' assertion on appeal that his bipolar disorder contributed to his 
commission of the underlying offenses, such does not excuse Moss' multiple 
failures to abide by the terms of his probation after Moss received prescriptions 
for, but failed to take, medication to resolve his mental health issues. (Se~ 
2/8/11 Tr., p.42, L.22 - p.43, L.3.) 
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The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably 
determined that Moss was no longer an appropriate candidate for community 
supervision. This conclusion is supported by Moss' history of theft-related 
offenses, the risk he presents to the community, and his demonstrated inability 
to comply with the terms of probation. Given any reasonable view of the facts, 
Moss has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
D. Moss Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Declining To Reduce His Sentence Upon Revoking 
Probation 
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original 
sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule 
35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing 
State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State 
v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)). A court's 
decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject 
to the well-established standards governing whether a sentence is excessive. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. Those standards require an 
appellant to "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence 
was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." State v. 
Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are: 
"( 1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978). 
The reviewing court "will examine the entire record encompassing events before 
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and after tl:e original judgment," i.e_, ''facts zxis.ti0g when the sentence was 
imposed as well as events occurTing between the o6gtna! sentencing and the 
revocation of probation,'' Haninaton, 148 Idaho at 29, 218 P_3d at 8. 
Citing the same factors he claims militated against the revocation of his 
probation, Moss argues that the district court abused its discretion by declining to 
reduce the unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, originally imposed 
upon his convictions for forgery in Docket No_ 38541 _ (Appellant's brief, pp.20-
22.) For the reasons already set forth in section IILC., supra, and incorporated 
herein by reference, Moss has failed to show that he was entitled to a reduction 
of hrs sentence. Moss has failed to show an abuse of discret:on. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders revoking probation in Docket Nos. 38590 and 38600 and its order 
revoking probation and ordering Moss' sentence executed without reduction in 
Docket No. 38541. 
DATED this 11 th day of April 2012. 
LORI A. FLEM!f\lG 
Deputy Attorney'General 
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